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ABSTRACT
We are facing the exhaustion of newly assignable IPv4 ad-
dresses. Unfortunately, IPv6 is not yet deployed widely
enough to fully replace IPv4, and it is unrealistic to expect
that this is going to change before we run out of IPv4 ad-
dresses. Letting hosts seamlessly communicate in an IPv4-
world without assigning a unique globally routable IPv4 ad-
dress to each of them is a challenging problem, for which
many solutions have been proposed. Some prominent ones
target towards carrier-grade-NATs (CGN), e.g. [1], which
we feel is a bad idea. Instead, we propose using specialized
NATs at the edge that treat some of the port number bits as
part of the address.
1. INTRODUCTION
It appears inevitable that the Internet will become a poly-
morphic architecture, many different technologies will have
to co-exist in the future. This becomes obvious when look-
ing at IPv4 exhaustion, while there is only marginal IPv6
deployment. Operators are getting worried about extremely
large routing tables, an Internet core that does not really want
to know about all those bright traffic engineering ideas from
the edge, and the increased mobility of end-devices. This
names but a few of the issues the IRTF Routing Research
Group (RRG)1 is trying to tackle.
The looming exhaustion of the free IANA IPv4 pool cre-
ates even more urgent problems. Many large Internet Ser-
vice Providers (ISPs) face the problem, that their networks’
customer edges are so large that, even giving the “front” of
each customer premises equipment (CPE) only one single
IPv4 address, they need two to five /8s of IPv4 space [2].
However, it is highly unlikely that they would be allocated
that much public IPv4 address space. Therefore ISPs have
to come-up with something more ingenious. Deploying a
NAT is a direct consequence of the design of a new protocol
which is incompatible on the wire, there is not the slightest
compatibility mode. We may not like this, and we certainly
do not, but NATs are inevitable.
The approach ISPs are testing is being called Carrier Grade
NAT (CGN). It is essentially a number of IPv4 NATs in the
core of their networks and various tunneling and transla-
1http://www.irtf.org/charter?gtype=rg&group=rrg
tion techniques [1]. If the CPE has dual stack, traffic where
source and destination is IPv6 would not have to be NAT-
ted, but IPv4 would be heavily NATted. We can contrast this
to, for example, NAT-PT [3, 4] on the CPE, which would
probably scale to the needs of even a large non-consumer
backbone. But, as we noted above, very large broadband
consumer providers would need far too much IPv4 space for
the NAT-PT front ends for their large consumer networks.
Our main concern is that the imminent IPv4 address ex-
haustion is leading operators to deploy extremely damaging
technology.
1.1 Why Carrier-Grade-NATs are harmful
We have taken up a desperate search for alternatives. The
reasons are simple:
“Carrier grade” is a euphemism for centralized. More se-
mantics move to the core of the network. This is bad in and
of itself. Net-heads call it “telco-think” because it is the telco
model of smarts in the core as opposed to the Internet model
of a simple, just forward packets, core and smart edges.
With the smarts at the edges, e.g. NAT-PT, one can easily
field new protocols between consenting end-points by just
tweaking the NATs at the consenting CPEs, even adding ap-
plication layer gateways (ALGs) if needed. However, CGN’s
do not build an Internet walled garden at the edges, they
build it by restricting the core.
With NAT in the core, if a customer wants a new applica-
tion protocol which requires cooperation from the NAT, they
get to beg help from the broadband providers’ engineers and
lawyers, and all other users of carrier grade NATs. This is
the ultimate horror the NAT-haters fear, and they are not all
that wrong.
One broadband provider has recently received a lot of bad
press for just this, though we know that the engineers are
very far from those responsible. This shows that all new
application protocols have to go through the carrier loving
lawyers to be allowed to be handled by the NATs in their
core. Today’s NATs are typically mitigated by ALG’s of
which the customer has some degree of control, e.g. port
forwarding or UPnP. However, this is not expected to work
anymore with CGN’s. CGN proposals admit that it is not ex-
pected that applications that require specific port assignment
or port mapping from the NAT box will keep working [1].
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We believe this is not an option and that the end-user must
have the ability to control their own ALGs. So, if some-
one wants to deploy a new application, they can talk to the
broadband providers’ lawyers or do it over HTTP, pick your
poison.
And remember that, as IPv6 deploys, and we want to have
one Internet, i.e. IPv4 nodes talking freely with IPv6 nodes,
then translation must be done somewhere. The challenge is
whether someone can figure out a scheme where it is done
for these large networks? We believe it should be at the cus-
tomer edge, not in the core.
Another issue with CGN’s is scalability. ISPs face a ten-
sion in the placement within their network: to achieve the
desired effect means to aggregate as much as possible, but
on the other hand this creates a massive state problem. To
reduce the state, the placement location could be somewhere
closer to the edge, where the benefits are limited.
It is not clear how a CGN should maintain per-session
state in a scalable manner. This is particularly relevant given
that each customer is very likely to open many TCP con-
nections in parallel. State for improperly terminated ses-
sions could remain stale for some time. The CGN hence
trades scalability for the amount of state that needs to be
kept, and this makes optimally placing a CGN a hard engi-
neering problem.
Tracing back hackers, spammers and other criminals will
be impossible, unless all the connection based mapping in-
formation is recorded and stored. This would cause not only
concern for law enforcement services, but also for privacy
advocates. Which brings us to other security related prob-
lems with CGN’s in the next section.
1.2 Security of CGN
NATs frequently need to initiate translation for secondary
port numbers. This may be a decision based on packet in-
spection (i.e., looking for PORT commands in FTP [5] ses-
sions), or it may rely on explicit signaling from the end host
via protocols such as UPnP. Either way, CGNs pose a secu-
rity threat and/or an administrative nightmare.
The issue is proper authentication of such requests. Most
UPnP devices do not implement any security features. Even
if they did, there would be no way to administer the security
mechanism. Every end-user device would have to have a se-
cret corresponding to some authentication field in the CGN.
End users will not set these up properly; providers do not
want to maintain such a database.
Decisions made based on packet inspection are just as
problematic. A request from one customer could easily re-
quest opening a port for another customer’s addresses, simi-
lar to the Java-based attack described by Martin et al [6].
2. PROPOSED SOLUTION
As the specific problem is insufficient IPv4 address space
to number the IPv4-speaking customers, we propose to ex-
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Figure 1: Proposed architecture: CN and CPE are on
customer premises and learn port-range allocation via
DHCP; PE is dual-stack IPv4/IPv6 and connect customer
via a direct interface; BR’s are also dual-stack and ter-
minate the IPv4 tunnels.
a single IPv4 address which is extended by “stealing” bits
from the port number in the TCP/UDP header, leaving the
applications a reduced fixed range of ports. In the face of
IPv4 address exhaustion, the need for addresses is stronger
than the need to be able to address thousands of applications
on a single host, and broadband consumers are not antici-
pated to deploy a massive number of applications over IPv4
(if they did, CGN would be even more damaging than this
bit-stealing proposal). Assuming we could limit the applica-
tions’ port addressing to 6 (or 7) bits, we can increase the ef-
fective size of an IPv4 address by 10 (or 9) additional bits. In
this scenario, 1024 (or 512) customers could be multiplexed
on the same IPv4 address, while allowing them a fixed range
of 64 (or 128) ports. We call this extended addressing or
A+P (address plus port) addressing.
2.1 Changes required to the network
Figure 1 summarizes the devices involved in this solution:
•Customer Premises Equipment (CPE), the cable/DSL mo-
dem
•Customer-Provided-NAT (CN), optional
•Provider Edge Router (PE), AKA customer aggregation
router
•Provider Border Router (BR), provider’s edge to other
providers
•Network Core Routers (Core), provider routers not PE or
BR
Customer-Premises-Equipment. As the customer’s hosts
should be unaware of the restricted range of ports and the
extended A+P addressing scheme, translation would be done
at the border between the customer and the provider. In the
most common case, this is the provider provisioned cable
or DSL modem on the customer’s premises into which the
customer plugs their single computer or a LAN. This CPE
would be aware of the A+P extended addressing, and would
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provide the A+P NAT function between the customer’s LAN
and the provider.
This would require modification of current CPE, but the
CGN draft [1] says “It is expected that the home gateway is
either software upgradable, replaceable or provided by the
service provider as part of a new contract.”
The customer premises equipment would be configured,
hopefully automatically, with
• IPv4 and/or IPv6 addressing for the customer’s LAN
•The IPv4 A+P extended address for the WAN side to con-
nect to the provider,
•An IPv6 address for the WAN side to connect to the provider,
and
•The range of port number to use on the WAN side.
Customer-Provided-NAT. Alternatively, as occasionally hap-
pens today, the customer could provide the A+P NAT and the
CPE would then be configured as a simple cable/DSL mo-
dem. This customer A+P NAT would be configured with the
IPv4 address and port-rage allocated to the customer. This
could be done, for example, via a vendor or other extension
to DHCP.
The customer NAT is entirely optional. The customer
does not have to operate such a device. If they do not, then
the provider installed CPE could handle the mappings. A
mixture of CPE and CN device is also possible, where the
customer gets full control over the CPE via an administra-
tive login.
Provider-Edge Router. During transition, customers with
legacy CPE and no CN would have the A+P NAT function
provided by the provider’s customer aggregation, AKA PE,
router. Customer packets would be A+P NATted as soon
as they reached the PE. If we assume only layer 2 devices
which connect directly to an interface of the PE, then there
should be no problems for the customer to be unaware of the
restricted port range.
In a sense this is a carrier-grade-NAT. However, two im-
portant differences apply: (a) the customer has the possi-
bility to operate on non-NATed-ports and is aware of which
ports will be NATed and which are not; and (b) the carrier-
grade-NAT is very close to the customer (e.g., on the PE
router), so should scale well as a NAT.
But note that having the A+P NAT on the PE router is
effectively the same walled garden effect that a CGN would
cause. Therefore this is only a transition mechanism and a
method for connecting customers who do not need or request
control of their own application destinies.
Provider Border Routers. Routers at the provider’s edge
which faces other providers need to be aware of the extended
A+P IPv4 addresses. They must have the ability to forward
packets to the PE based on IPv4 address and port.
For example, the provider network could use IPv6 as a
tunneling mechanism. The CPE or PE routers would en-
capsulate the A+P pseudo address within an IPv6 address
using a well-known IPv6 prefix. Then the core would route
on the IPv6 address. The border routers would recognize
the well-known IPv6 prefix and decapsulate and forward the
IPv4 address.
Thus the provider’s network could be IPv6 only, or any
other layer 3/2.5 protocol.
Network Core Routers. If the tunneling technique within
the provider is chosen appropriately, it would not be required
that the network’s core routers are capable of understand-
ing A+P extended IPv4 addressing. In fact, as doing so
would require that the core deploy IPv4 all the way to the
PE routers, and the original problem was insufficient IPv4
space, we assume that IPv6 or other non-IPv4 tunneling will
be preferred.
Note that, in the IPv6 tunneling technique we use as an
example, all customers hosted on the same IPv4 address do
not need to be attached to the same PE router. Normal IPv6
routing protocols would be used, and moving one customer
from a specific A+P pool could be done by the PE announc-
ing a longer IPv6 prefix.
2.2 Design of the A+P NAT Device
There are a number of delicate design choices for the A+P
NAT device. We present our preferred solution here. Other
options are discussed in Appendix 5.
Legacy hosts would send IPv4 packets from any port(s).
We are not expecting to change end-hosts; therefore we re-
quire some kind of NAT. However, one of the basic require-
ments is that the customer must be able to run their own
servers and NATs. This leads to several constraints:
1. We want to enforce the analog of BCP 38 [7], for many
obvious reasons. This means that no packets outside of
the assigned address and port number range should leave
the PE for the network.
2. We want minimal configuration. There should be no need
for the customer to tell the ISP that they have purchased
an A+P-grade home NAT.
3. We must support unmodified computers and NATs.
4. We want the PE router to be as accommodating as possi-
ble to strange protocols it knows nothing about. It may do
its own packet snooping and/or ALGs for things it knows
about (i.e., FTP, SIP, Skype), but should leave it to the
customer’s box to handle World of Woolcraft, Second Af-
terlife, or what have you.
5. Conversely, if the customer’s box has done something, it
should be left alone; it should not be retranslated.
These principles lead us to the following design:
1. The PE should discard any outbound packets that don’t
originate from the proper IP address. (Constraint 1)
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2. An A+P gateway should include some option in the DHCP
request message, to inform the PE router of its abilities.
(Constraint 2)
3. If no A+P signaling was done, the PE router should per-
form NATting, including whatever ALG functions it can.
(Constraints 3 and 4)
4. The PE router should leave intact any packets from the
proper address and port range. (Constraints 4 and 5)
Note that a customer with no NAT or with a non-A+P NAT
may emit packets within the proper port range by accident,
thus accidentally violating part of point 4 above. We solve
that by DHCP-based signaling from the A+P box: the A+P
option in the DHCP request tells the PE that a customer-
provided box will do all NATting according to this design. In
that case, the primary function of the PE router is to enforce
restrictions on port numbers in outbound packets.
We leave unspecified for now the question of how large
a port number range is allocated to each customer. We an-
ticipate that the allocation available to a customer will be
determined by ISP-specific policy, perhaps as a function of
the fee charged to the customer. If variable allocations are to
be supported, i.e., the ability for a customer to request more
port numbers (and hence more possible simultaneous con-
nections) at one time and fewer at another, the natural way
to signal this is in the DHCP A+P request option.
A more interesting question is how to increase the range
dynamically. A simple DHCP release/request cycle could be
used, but if the proper adjacent block of port numbers was
not available, this would entail tearing down existing con-
nection or reNATting them. The disadvantages of the former
are obvious; adopting the latter approach would bring back
all of the disadvantages this scheme is intended to avoid.
One possible answer is to allocate additional 〈address, port-
range〉 pairs. We leave this issue for future work.
IPv6 and mixed V4-V6 traffic. Note that if IPv4/IPv6 dual
stack is provided on the customer’s LAN, IPv6 to IPv6 des-
tinations would be be transported untranslated from the cus-
tomer’s host to the provider’s border with other providers.
If the customer has an IPv6-only LAN, then the device
providing A+P translation should also provide NAT-PT ser-
vice so that the customer could communicate with the IPv4
Internet.
Handling ICMP. ICMP is problematic for all NATs, be-
cause it lacks port numbers. A+P routing exacerbates the
problem.
Most ICMP messages fall into one of two categories: er-
ror reports, or ECHO/ECHO reply (commonly known as
“ping”). For error reports, the offending packet header is em-
bedded within the ICMP packet; NATs can then rewrite that
portion and route the packet to the actual destination host.
This functionality will remain the same with A+P; however,
the provider’s BR will need to examine the embedded header
to learn with A+P NAT is handling it, while that box will do
the necessary rewriting.
ECHO and ECHO reply are more problematic. For ECHO,
the border router must rewrite the “Identifier” and perhaps
“Sequence Number” fields in the ICMP request, so that re-
turning ECHO REPLY packets may be routed correctly. We
suggest to rewrite the information in the sequence number
to allow the BR returning ECHO replies to come back to the
appropriate host.
Handling IP fragments. Much like ICMP packets, IP frag-
mented packets are renowned to be hard to handle in any
address translation mechanism [8]. In fact, only the first
IP fragment contains the TCP (UDP) header. This issue is
commonly dealt with by keeping additional state at the NAT
device which allows fragments to be mapped to the correct
TCP (UDP) session. In the A+P NAT solution, fragments
coming from the internal domain can be avoided if the core
network runs IPv6 only and the PE ensures that no layer-
3 fragmentation is performed by the customer equipment.
Fragments coming from the external domain are harder to
handle. Commercial NATs extract the port number out of
the first fragment and keep that information to map subse-
quent fragments. Moreover, when the first fragment is not
the first one to be received at the NAT, the fragment needs to
be stored until the port number is known [9].
3. RELATED WORK
There is a long history of treating port numbers as part of
the network address. It was considered as part of the design
of TCP/IP [10]. In the same time frame, Pup [11] and the Xe-
rox Network System architecture [12] included the “socket
number” as part of an address; the other two parts were a
network number and a -bit host number. However, only the
network number was used for routing. Later, Bellovin and
colleagues made suggestions that embedded the service in
the IP address; see [13] and [14].
The work most closely related to A+P routing is [15]. In
it, Hang Zhao, Chi-Kin Chau, and Steven M. Bellovin sug-
gest routing on the 〈address,port〉/48 string, i.e., a route per
service. Thus, if there is no route advertisement for, say,
〈A,25〉/48, every router along the path will decline to for-
ward SMTP packets to host A. However, that work had no
notion of address or port number translation.
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5. OPEN QUESTIONS
•How many ports does the end-host need? We should ex-
pect a few hundreds of outgoing connections. Incom-
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ing connections are instead much less popular (only p2p
and something else), so maybe 64 or 128 is a fair deal?
Maybe 32 is enough?
•Well known ports are an issue. Customers will not be able
to offer services on well known ports. They may or may
not get a port-range that overlaps with the well known
port-range, but so far this proposal does not address this
issue.
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APPENDIX
A. OTHER DESIGN OPTIONS
There are other design possibilities than the ones we pre-
sented in Section 2.2, in particular when handling outbound
packets. We list those here.
1. Ignore/do nothing. Since a portion of the port number is
meant to extend the IPv4 address, allowing customers to
produce packets out of their assigned port range should be
regarded as letting them "spoof" the source IP address. In
particular, return packets will be routed back to a different
host! While this might be the most cost-effective way,
it certainly has security issues. Even worse, it prevents
unaware applications on the customer’s side from running
properly.
2. Filter. If the PE drops all packets that are not originated
from the allocated source port range, then some of the se-
curity concerns could be reduced. However, the customer
would still be unhappy with malfunctioning applications.
3. Symmetric translation. The PE acts as a symmetric NAT
for every outgoing connection. More precisely, if a cus-
tomer sends a packet, the PE will pick a port in the cus-
tomer’s assigned port range and create a mapping for the
following tuple: <protocol, mapped source port, destina-
tion IP, destination port> ⇒ <source IP, source port>. If
an inbound packet matches an entry in the mapping ta-
ble, it will be translated back, and sent to the original
port. If there is no entry in the mapping table it will be
forwarded directly to the customer without modifications.
This behavior can be obtained by slightly modifying stan-
dard existing technology (e.g., symmetric NAT for out-
going connections and static port mapping for incoming
connections).
A limitation of this approach arises if the customer is au-
tonomously running a NAT which is unaware of the re-
stricted port range. Those devices are widely deployed in
today’s Internet and they will create 2 levels of address-
translations. However, we expect the customer that is run-
ning their own NAT gateway to be able to correctly con-
figure it according to the port range that the customer has
been assigned from the provider, thus mitigating problems
with the traversal of multiple NATs.
4. PE ensures source ports are from within the allocated
address space, and if not uses NAT to translate towards
special "excess" IP addresses. This solution would allo-
cate pseudo-IPv4 to customers who want to run their own
home-gateway-NATs or servers. In addition to this ad-
dress space the PE would have some extra address space
to do the NATs for the customers. In this case the port-
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overlap problem discussed above would be fixed. How-
ever, additional address space is needed and a majority
of customers might not use the specific allocated address
space at all.
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